Abstract. Contemporary open systems use components developed by different parties, linked together dynamically in unforeseen constellations. Code needs to live up to strict security requirements, and ensure the correct functioning of its objects even when they collaborate with external, potentially malicious, objects. In this paper we propose special specification predicates that model risk and trust in open systems. We specify Miller, Van Cutsem, and Tulloh's escrow exchange example, and discuss the meaning of such a specification. We propose a novel Hoare logic, based on four-tuples, including an invariant describing properties preserved by the execution of a statement as well as a postcondition describing the state after execution. We model specification and programing languages based on the Hoare logic, prove soundness, and prove the key steps of the Escrow protocol.
Introduction
Traditional systems designs are based on a closed world assumption: drawing a sharp border around a system where the system as a whole can be trusted because every component inside the border is known to be trustworthy, or is confined [25] by trustworthy mechanisms. Open systems, on the other hand, have an open world assumption: they must interact with a wide range of component objects with different levels of mutual trust (or distrust) -and whose configuration dynamically changes. Given a method request x.m(y), what can we conclude about the behaviour of this request if we know nothing about the receiver x?
In this paper, we lay the foundations for reasoning about the correctness of these kinds of open systems. Building on the object-capability security model [30] we introduce a first-class notion of trust, where we write "o obeys Spec" to mean that object o can be trusted to obey specification Spec. The obeys predicate is hypothetical: there is no central authority that can assign trustworthiness (or not) to objects; there is no trust bit that we can test. Rather, "o obeys Spec" is an assumption that may or may not be true, and we will use that assumption to reason by cases. If we trust an object, we can use the object's specification Spec to determine the results of a method call on that object. If we don't trust the object, we determine the maximum amount of damage the call could do: the risk of calling a method that turns out not to meet its specification.
Risks are effects against which we want to guard our objects: bounds on the potential damage caused by calls to untrusted objects. The key to delineating risks are two further hypothetical predicates: MayAccess and MayAffect. We write MayAffect(o,p)
2 Escrow Exchange Figure 1 shows a first attempt to implement an escrow exchange, also shown in previous work [31, 36] . We model both money and goods by Purses (a resource model proposed in E [32] ). The call dst.deposit(amt, src) will either transfer amt resources from the src purse to the dst purse and return true, or do nothing and return false. A new, empty purse can be created at any time by asking an existing purse to sprout -the new purse has a zero balance but can then be filled via deposit. The goal of the escrow is to exchange amt goods for price money, between the purses of a seller and buyer. To make the exchange transactional, we use two private escrow purses, one for on each side of the transaction (money and goods). Lines 3-6 of Figure 1 show how we first set up the escrow purses, by sprouting two new purses (escrowMoney and escrowGoods) from their respective input purses.
It is important that the escrow purses are newly created within the method, and cannot have been manipulated or retained by the buyer or seller, which is why the escrow asks sellerMoney to make one, and buyerGoods to make the other. The requirements of an open system means that the escrow method cannot have the escrow purses before the transaction, because the escrow cannot know the right kind of purses to create, and there is no central trusted authority that could provide them. Buyers and sellers cannot provide escrows purses directly, precisely because we must assume they don't trust each other: if they did, they wouldn't need to use an escrow.
Second, we attempt to escrow the buyer's money by transferring it from the buyerMoney purse into the new escrowMoney purse -line 8. If this deposit request returns true, then the money will have been transferred. If the deposit fails we abort the transaction. Third, we attempt to escrow the seller's goods -line 16, again by depositing them into the other escrow purse. If we are unsuccessful, we again abort the transaction, after we have returned the escrowed money to the buyer -lines 21 and 22. At this point (line 26) the deal method should have sole access to sufficient money and goods in the escrow purses. The method completes the transaction by transferring the escrowed money and goods into the respective destination purses -lines 26 and 27. Thanks to the escrow purses, these transfers should not fail, and indeed, if deal_version1 is called in good faith it will carry out the transaction correctly. Unfortunately, we cannot assume good faith in a mutually untrusting open system.
The failure of deal_version1
The method in Figure 1 does not behave correctly in an open system. The critical problems are assumptions about trust: both the code and the specification implicitly trust the purse objects with which they interact.
Imagine if sellerMoney was a malicious, untrustworthy object. At line 4, the sprout call could itself return a malicious object, which would then be stored in escrowMoney. At line 8, escrowMoney.deposit(price, buyerMoney) would let the malicious escrowMoney purse steal all the money out of buyerMoney purse, and still return false. As a result, the seller would lose all their money, and receive no goods! Even if the seller was more cautious, and themselves sprouted a special temporary purse with a balance of exactly price to pass in as sellerMoney, they would still lose all this money without any recompense.
Perhaps there is something else we could do -a trusted method on every object, say, that returns true if the object is trusted, and false otherwise? The problem, of course, is that an object that is untrustworthy is, well, untrustworthy: we cannot expect a trusted method ever to return false. This leads to our definition of trust: trust is hypothetical, and in relation to some specification of expected behaviour.
Modelling Trust and Risk: obeys , MayAccess and MayAffect
The key claim of this paper is that, to reason about the behaviour of systems in an open world, we need specifications that let us talk about trust and risk explicitly. In the rest of this section, we informally introduce three novel specification language constructs: obeys to model trust, and MayAccess and MayAffect to model risk, show how they can be used to specify the purse and escrow examples, and argue a revised deal_version2 method can meet that specification. Section 3 formalises these ideas.
To model trust, we introduce a special predicate, obeys , of the form o obeys Spec which we interpret to mean that the current object trusts o to adhere to the specification Spec. Because we generally can't be sure that an object -especially one supplied from elsewhere in an open system -can actually be trusted to obey a particular specification, our reasoning and specifications are hypothetical: analysing the same piece of code under different trust hypotheses -i.e. assuming that particular objects may or may not be trusted to obey particular specifications.
Thus, if object o can be trusted to obey specification Spec, and Spec had a policy describing the behaviour of some method m, then we may expect the method call o.m(...) to behave according to that policy -otherwise, all bets are off.
To model risk, we introduce predicates MayAccess and MayAffect, which express whether an object may read or may affect another object or property. We will write MayAffect(o,p) to mean that it is possible that some method invocation on o would affect the object or property p. Similarly, we will write MayAccess(o,p) to mean that it is possible that the code in object o could potentially gain a capability to access to p -that is, a reference to p. In practice, MayAccess(o,p) means that p is in the transitive closure of the points-to relation on the heap starting from o including both public and private references.
Valid Purse: Specifying Purse
Using obeys , MayAccess, and MayAffect, we write the ValidPurse specification in Figure 2 that makes trust and risk explicit.
ValidPurse consists of five policies. Pol_deposit_1 and Pol_deposit_2 taken together distinguish between a successful and an unsuccessful deposit, signalled by returning true or false respectively. In the first case, i.e. Pol_deposit_1 where the result is true, argument src must have been a valid purse (src obeys ValidPurse) which can trade with the receiver, and src must have sufficient balance. In the second case, i.e. Pol_deposit_2 where the result is false, either src was not a valid purse, or would not trade with the receiver, or had insufficient funds. To quote Miller et al. [32] : "A reported successful deposit can be trusted as much as one trusts the purse one is depositing into".
The last two lines in the postcondition of Pol_deposit_1 and Pol_deposit_2 provide framing conditions. In the first case, the transaction will happen, but all other purses will be unmodified (line 14 in figure 2 ) , whereas in the second case no purses will be modified (line 24 in figure 2 ). Another framing condition, appears on lines 15, 25 and 36 of figure 2, and requires that the methods do not leak access to any ValidPurse object. In other words, if after the method call, a pre-existing o has access to a ValidPurse object p, then o already had access to a p before the call.
Pol_sprout promises that the result is a trusted purse that can trade with the receiver, no other valid purse's balance is affected, and references have not been leaked. method call. Such a specification cannot be easily translated into one which does not make use of this facility, as in: (B) scr obeys ValidPurse ∧ amt ∈ N {res=this.deposit(amt,src)} res (B) differs from (A) in that (B) requires us to establish that scr obeys ValidPurse before making the call, while (A) does not.
Establishing Mutual Trust
An escrow must build a two-way, trusted transfer by combining one-way transfers. From Pol_deposit_1 we obtain that the call res1=dest.deposit(amt, src) lets us conclude res1∧ dest obeys ValidPurse→ src obeys ValidPurse. This trust is just one way: from the destination to the source purse. We can establish mutual trust between two purses by then attempting to perform a second deposit in the reverse direction from destination to source: res2=src.deposit(amt, dest) which in turn gives res2∧ src obeys ValidPurse→ dest obeys ValidPurse. Reasoning conditionally, on a path where res1 ∧ res2 are true, we can then establish mutual trust:
We establish this formally in Section 3.4, having only argued informally earlier [17, 36] .
As with much of our reasoning, this is both conditional and hypothetical: at a particular code point, when two deposit requests have succeeded (or rather, that they have both reported success) then we can conclude that either both are trust worthy, or both are untrustworthy: we have only hypothetical knowledge of the obeys predicate. Two way deposit calls are sufficient to establish mutual trust, but come with risks. For example, as part of validating that a buyer's purse the seller's purse, we must pass the buyer's purse as an argument in a deposit call to the seller's purse, e.g.
Escrow with Explicit Mutual Trust
1 method deal_version2( ) //
sellerMoney.deposit(0, buyerMoney)
If the seller's purse is not in fact trustworthy, then it can take this opportunity to steal all the money in the buyer's purse before the transaction officially starts, even if the amt that is supposed to be deposited is 0.
We can minimise this risk by careful use of escrow purses. Rather than mutually validating buyers and sellers directly, we can create an escrow purse on the destination side of the transaction (the seller's money and the buyer's goods) and then mutually validate the buyer's and sellers actual purses against the escrow -resulting in a chain of mutual trust between the destination purse and the escrow purse, and the escrow purse and the source purse. This allows us to hypothesise that the source and destination purses are mutually trusting before we start on the transaction proper.
The resulting escrow method is in Figure 3 . Line 4 creates a escrowMoney purse and then lines 5-10 hypothetically establish mutual trust between the escrowMoney, sellerMoney, and buyerMoney purses. The sellerMoney purse doesn't need to validate escrowMoney explicitly (sellerMoney.deposit(0,escrowMoney)) because the sprout method specification says sprouted purses can trusted as much as their parent purses. (Figure 4 fail, we abort. Afterwards we do exactly the same, but for goods purses rather than money purses. Finally, we carry out the escrow exchange itself, in exactly the same manner as lines 8-29 of the first implementation in Figure 1 . Figure 5 shows a specification for the revised escrow deal method from Figure 3 . This specification uses conditional and hypothetical reasoning to distinguish four cases, based on the value of the result and the trustworthiness of the participants. We use these auxiliary definitions:
Specifying the Mutual Trust Escrow
The set PPrs contains the four participant purses passed as arguments. BadPPrs contains the untrustworthy participant purses. GoodPrs are all trustworthy purses in the system that do conform to the ValidPurse specification, and OthrPrs are the trustworthy purses that do not participate in this particular deal. We can now discuss the four cases of the policy:
The result is true and all participant purses are trustworthy. Then, the goods and money purses can trade with each other, and there was sufficient money in the buyer's purse and sufficient goods in the sellers purse. In this case, everything is fine, so the transfer can proceed: price will have been transferred from the buyer's to the seller's money purse, and amt will have been transferred from the seller's to the buyer's goods purse. No risk arises: no other purses' balance will change (whether passed in to the method or not).
2 nd case: The result is false and all participant purses are trustworthy. Then one or more of the functional correctness conditions are not satisfied: purses' were unable to trade with each other, or input purses did not have sufficient balance. Again, no risk arises to any purses.
The result is false and some participant purse is untrustworthy. In this case, no trustworthy purses' balances have been changed -unless they were already accessible by an untrustworthy purse passed in to the method. 1 th case: The result is true and some participant purse is untrustworthy -actually at least two matching participant purses are untrustworthy. That is, a pair of matching purses have coöperated to suborn the escrow and we cannot tell. Therefore, either both money purses are untrustworthy, (as per line 35), or both goods purses are untrustwor-thy, (as per line 36), or all four are bad. The risk is that an uninvolved trustworthy purse's balance can be changed if it was previously accessible from a bad purse. The first and second cases correspond to a traditional specification, because traditional specifications assume all objects are trustworthy. The third and fourth cases arise precisely because we are explicitly modelling the trust and risk involved in an open system.
Discussion The 3
rd and 4 th case represent more of a risk than we would like: ideally (as in the 2 nd case) we'd hope nothing should have changed. But an escrow method cannot undo a system that is already suborned -if one of the participant purses is already benefiting from a security breach, passing that purse in to this method gives it an opportunity to exercise that breach. On the other hand, the risk is contained: this method cannot make things worse.
The 4 th case does not prevent trustworthy participant purses from being modified, to cater e.g., for the possibility that the two money purses are trustworthy, while the two goods purses are not, in which case the money transaction will take place as expected, while all bets are off about the goods transaction. We can give the stronger guarantee for the 3 rd case, because by the time the escrow starts making non-0 transactions it has established that the purses in each pair are both either trustworthy or both not.
Most importantly (perhaps surprisingly) the return value of the method, res, does not indicate whether the participants were trustworthy or not. A true result may be returned in the 1 st case (all purses trustworthy) as well as the 4 th (some purses are untrustworthy). The return value indicates only whether the escrow attempted to complete the transaction (returning true) or abort (returning false). This came as a surprise to us (and to the escrow's designers [31] .) As with much of our reasoning around trust, this leads to yet more conditional reasoning, which must be interpreted hypothetically.
Nevertheless, the return value does communicate a valuable guarantee to an honest participant, whose money and goods purses are both trustworthy: If deal returns true, then the exchange has taken place. Furthermore if it returns false, the exchange has not taken place and with no more risk to the honest purses than existed before the call. The ValidEscrow specification also gives a guarantee to other purse objects even if they did not participate in the deal: dishonest purses can only change other purses' balances if they had prior access to those other purses.
A Formal Model of Trust and Risk
In this section we provide an overview of our core programming language, Focal, our specification language, Chainmail, and our Hoare logic. The Hoare logic uses fourtuples because it includes an invariant that must be preserved during the execution of a statement as well as a postcondition established afterwards. We also outline a key step required to prove that deal_version2 meets the ValidEscrow specification: we prove that two purses can establish mutual trust, and formally delineate the risk. Many details are relegated to our technical report [18] ; here we adopt its numbering for definitions.
F ocal
We define a small object oriented language, Focal (Featherweight Object Capability Language, not to be confused with FOCAL [28] ). Focal supports classes, fields and methods. (Figures 1 and 3 are effectively examples of Focal.) Focal is memory-safe: it does not allow addresses to be forged, or non-existent methods or fields to be called, read or written. Focal is dynamically typed: it does not check that the arguments to a method call or a field write are of the appropriate type either statically or dynamically: similar to JavaScript, Grace, E, and Dart's unchecked mode.
Modules, M , are mappings from class identifiers to Focal class definitions, and from predicate identifiers to Chainmail assertions as described in section 3.2. The linking operator * combines these definitions, provided that the modules' mappings have separate domains, and performs no other checks. This reflects the open world setting, where objects of different provenance interoperate without a central authority. For example, taking M p as a module implementing purses, and M e as another module implementing the escrow, M p * M e is defined but M e * M e is not.
Focal enforces a weak form of privacy for fields; only the receiver may modify these fields, and anybody may read them.
The operational semantics of Focal takes a module M and a runtime state σ = frame × heap and maps statements onto a new state σ .
Definition 6 (Shape of Execution).
; : Module × state × Stmts −→ state Arising and Reachable Configurations Policies need to be satisfied in all configurations (pairs of states and statements) which may arise during execution of the program. For example, if a program contains a class which has field which is not exported, and where this field is initialized to 0 by the constructor, and incremented by 3 in all method calls, then in the arising configurations the value of this field is guaranteed to be a multiple of 3. Thus, through the concept of arising configurations we can ignore configurations which are guarantee not to arise.
To define arising configurations we need the concept of initial configuration, and reachability. A configuration is reachable from some starting configuration if it is reached during the evaluation of the starting configuration after any number of steps. We define the function Reach : Module × state × Stmts −→ P(state × Stmts) by cases on the structure of the statements. Note that Reach(M , σ, stmts) is defined, even when the execution should diverge. This is important, because it allows us to give meaning to capability policies without requiring termination. We then define Arising(M ) as the set of runtime configurations which may be reached during execution of some initial context (σ 0 ,stmts 0 ).
Definition 7 (Arising and Initial configurations).
Init : Module −→ P(state × Stmt)
where σ 0 = ((ι 0 , null), χ 0 ), and χ 0 (ι) = (Object, ∅) } Arising(M ) = (σ,stmts)∈Init(M ) Reach(M , σ, stmts)
Chainmail
Chainmail is a specification language where a specification is a conjunction of a set of named policies. (Figures 2 and 5 are examples of Chainmail specifications.)
Chainmail policies are based on one-state assertions (A) and two-state assertions (B). To express the state in which an expression is evaluated, we annotate it with a subscript. For example, x > 1 is a one-state, and x pre − x post = 1 is a two-state assertion. Validity of an assertion is defined in the usual manner, e.g. in a state σ with σ(x) = 4 we have M, σ |= x > 1. If we also have σ (x) = 3, then we obtain M , σ, σ |= x pre − x post = 1. Chainmail specifications may also express ghost information, which is not stored explicitly in the state σ but can be deduced from ite.g. the length of a null-terminated string.
Policies can have one of the three following forms: 1) invariants of the form A, which require that A holds at all visible states of a program; or 2) A { code } B, which require that execution of code in any state satisfying A will lead to a state satisfying B wrt the original state or 3) A { any_code } B which requires that execution of any code in a state satisfying A will lead to a state satisfying B wrt the original state.
Definition 12 (Policies). P olicy ::= A | A {code} B | A {any_code} B P olSpec ::= specification S { P olicy * } One-state assertions include assertions about expressions (such as ≤, > e.t.c.) and four additional assertions: Expr obeys SpecId to model trust, i.e. that an object confirms to a specification; and MayAccess and MayAffect to model risk, i.e. whether one object may access another, or alter a property. These are hypothetical, in that they talk about the potential effects or behaviour of code: we cannot somehow evaluate their truth-value when executing the program. The fourth assertion Expr :ClassId simply tests class membership.
Validity of one-state assertions is expressed through the judgment M , σ |= A. The key case is that some expression obeys a specification if it satisfies that specification's policies in all reachable configurations arising from the module. (from Definition 13):
where z is a fresh variable in σ , and where we assume that PolSpecId was defined as specification PolSpecId { Policy 1 , ...Policy n }.
Two-state assertions allow us to compare properties of two different states. Validity of two-state assertions M , σ, σ |= B is defined similarly to one-state assertions, using cases. We can now define adherence to policy, M , σ |= pol Policy:
Definition 15 (Adherence to Policies).
-
Hoare Logic
The Hoare logic allows us to prove adherence to policies. In order to reflect that the code to be verified is executed in an open system, and that it calls code whose specification and trustworthiness is unknown to the code being verified, we use Hoare four-tuples rather than Hoare triples, so that not only do they guarantee a postcondition holds after execution of the code, but also guarantee that an invariant is preserved during execution of the code. These invariants are critical to modelling risk, as they let us talk about the absence of temporary but unwanted effects caused on objects during execution. A Hoare four-tuple is either M A { stms } A 1 B (executing stms in any state satisfying A will lead to a state which satisfies A ) or M A { stms } B 1 B (executing stms in any state satisfying A will lead to a state where the relation of the old and new state is described by B ). Critically, both promise that the relation between the initial state, and any of the intermediate states reached by execution of stms, will maintain the invariant B. The execution of stmts may call methods defined in M , and the predicates appearing in A, A , B , and B, may use predicates defined in M . When M is implicit from the context, we use the shorthand A { stms } A 1 B.
In order to model open systems, we require that after linking any module with the module at hand, the policy will be satisfied. As stated in [34] , "A programmer should be able to prove that his programs have various properties and do not malfunction, solely on the basis of what he can see from his private bailiwick." Figure 6 shows a selection of our Hoare rules. It starts with two familiar Hoare Logic rules: In (VARASG) and (FIELDASG) the postconditions use the previous value of the right-hand-side, and thus allow us to deduce, e.g. :
Definition 16 (Validity of Hoare Four-Tuples
this.f = 21 { this.f = 2 * this.f } this.f = 42 1 true. (METH-CALL-1) is also familiar, as it reasons over method calls under the assumption that the receiver obeys a specification S, and that the current state satisfies the precondition of m as defined in S.
The remaining rules are more salient.
(METH-CALL-2) expresses the basic axiom of object-capability systems that "only connectivity begets connectivity" [30] . It promises in the postcondition that the result of the method call v cannot expose access to any object z that wasn't accessible initially Fig. 6 . A selection of Hoare Logic rules; we assume that the module M is globally given to the method call's receiver x or argument y. Additionally, it also promises that, during execution of the method, accessibility does not change, unless the participants (here z and u) were accessible to the receiver and/or the argument before the call. Note that this latter promise is made via the invariant (fourth) rather than the postcondition (third) part of the Hoare-tuple. Note also that this rule is applicable even if we know nothing about the receiver of the call: this rule and the invariants are critical to reasoning about risk.
(CODE-INVAR-1) allows reasoning under the hypothesis that an object o obeys its specification S: in this case o can be trusted to act in accordance with S always.
(FRAME-METHCALL) also expresses an axiom of object-capability languages, namely that in order to cause some visible effect, one must have access to an object able to per-form the effect. Coupled with "only connectivity begets connectivity", this implies that a method can cause some effect only if the caller has (transitive) access to some object able to cause the effect (including perhaps the callee).
The remaining rules each make use of the entailment judgement → M , which allows converting back and forth between one-state and two-state assertions and comes in number of flavours; the relevant ones are defined as follows.
Definition 19 (Entailment).
The rules (CONS-3) and (CONS-4) make use of the entailment judgement to allow converting between one-and two-state postconditions during Hoare logic reasoning. To reason across sequenced computations s 1 ; s 2 , the (SEQUENCE) rule requires finding a one-state assertion A 2 that holds after s 1 and is the precondition of s 2 . It uses the entailment A, B 1 → M _, A 2 to require that s 1 's execution guarantees A 2 , and the entailment B 1 , B 2 → M B to require that the combined execution of s 1 and s 2 guarantees the top-level postcondition B.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of the Hoare Logic).
For all modules M , statements stms and assertions A, B and B ,
The theorem is proven in [18] .
In summary, we have four "code agnostic" rules -rules which are applicable regardless of the underlying code. Rules (FRAME-METHCALL) and (METH-CALL-2) express restrictions on the effects of a method call. Normally such restrictions stem from the specification of the method being called, but here we can argue in the absence of any such specifications, allowing us to reason about risk even in open systems. Rules (CODE-INVAR-1) and (CODE-INVAR-2) are applicable on any code, and allow us to assume that an object which obeys a specification S, satisfies all policies from S, and that the object, once trusted, will always be obeying S.
Proving Mutual Trust
We now use our Hoare Logic to prove the key steps of the escrow protocol, establishing mutual trust and delineating the risk. Here we have space to show just one-way trust between the escrow and seller in full: the remaining reasoning to establish mutual trust is outlined in the technical report [18] . Figure 7 shows the Hoare tuple for the first statement in method deal (line 4 from Figure 3 ). Lines 3-8 of Figure 7 describe the postcondition in case escrowMoney indeed obeys ValidPurse, while lines 9-17 make absolutely no assumption about the trustworthiness, or provenance, of escrowMoney. To obtain line 8, we apply a basic framing rule ((FRAME-GENERAL) in [18] ) and get ... { escrowMoney := sellerMoney.sprout } escrowMoney pre = escrowMoney 1 ..., and then, in conjunction with (CODE-INVAR-2), (CONS-2) we also obtain that (C) true { escrowMoney := sellerMoney.sprout} escrowMoney pre obeys ValidPurse → escrowMoney obeys ValidPurse 1 ... We can then apply a conjunction rule ((CONJ) in [18] ) on (B) and (C), and obtain the postcondition as in 4-8. To obtain 9-11, we will apply several of the code-agnostic rules. After all, here we cannot appeal to the specification of sprout, as we do not know whether sellerMoney adheres to ValidPurse. We start by application of (METH-CALL-2), and a consequence rule ((CONS-1) in [18] 4 Related Work Object Capabilities and Sandboxes. Capabilities were developed in the 60's by Dennis and Van Horn [10] within operating systems, and were adapted to the programming languages setting in the 70's [34] . Object capabilities were first introduced [30] in the early 2000s, and much recent work investigates the safety or correctness of object capability programs. Google's Caja [33] applies sandboxes, proxies, and wrappers to limit components' access to ambient authority. Sandboxing has been validated formally: Maffeis et al. [27] develop a model of JavaScript, demonstrate that it obeys two principles of object capability systems and show how untrusted applications can be prevented from interfering with the rest of the system. JavaScript analyses. More practically, there are a range of recent analyses of JavaScript [23, 5, 38, 26, 43 ] based on static analyses or type checking. Lerner et al. extend these approaches to ensure browser extensions observe "private mode" [26] , while Dimoulas et al. [11] enforce explicit access policies. The problem posed by the Escrow example is that it establishes a two-way dependency between trusted and untrusted systemsprecisely the kind of dependencies these techniques prevent. Concurrent Reasoning Our Hoare logic invariants are similar to the guarantees in Rely-Guarantee reasoning [22] . Deny-Guarantee [12] distinguishes between assertions guaranteed by a thread, and actions denied to all other threads. Deny properties correspond to our requirements that certain properties be preserved by all code linked to the current module. Compared with our work, rely-guarantee and deny-guarantee assumes coöperation: composition is legal only if threads adhere to their rely or deny properties and guarantees. Our modules have to be robust and ensure that their invariants cannot be affected by any arbitrary, uncertified, untrusted code. Relational models of trust. Artz and Gil [4] survey various types of trust in computer science generally, although trust has also been studied in specific settings, ranging from peer-to-peer systems [2] and cloud computing [20] to mobile ad-hoc networks [9] , the internet of things [19] , online dating [37] , and as a component of a wider socio-technical system [8, 45] . Considering trust (and risk) in systems design, Cahill et al.'s overview of the SECURE project [6] gives a good introduction to both theoretical and practical issues of risk and trust, including a qualitative analysis of an e-purse example. This project builds on Carbone's trust model [7] which offers a core semantic model of trust based on intervals to capture both trust and uncertainty in that trust. Earlier Abdul-Rahman proposed using separate relations for trust and recommendation in distributed systems [1] , more recently Huang and Nicol preset a first-order formalisation that makes the same distinction [21] . Solhaug and Stølen [42] consider how risk and trust are related to uncertainties over actual outcomes versus knowledge of outcomes. Compared with our work, these approaches produce models of trust relationships between high-level system components (typically treating risk as uncertainty in trust) but do not link those relations to the system's code. Logical models of trust. Various different logics have been used to measure trust in different kinds of systems. Some of the earliest work is Lampson et al.'s "speaks for" and "says" constructs [24] , clear precursors to our " obeys " but for authentication rather than specifications. Murray [35] models object capability patterns in CSP, and applies automatic refinement checking to analyse various properties in the presence of untrusted components. Ries et al. [40] evaluate trust under uncertainty by evaluating Boolean expressions in terms of real values. Carbone et al. [41] and Aldini [3] model trust using temporal logic. Primiero and Taddeo [39] have developed a modal type theory that treats trust as a second-order relation over relations between counterparties. Merro and Sibilio [29] developed a trust model for a process calculus based on labelled transition systems. Compared with ours, these approaches use process calculi or other abstract logical models of systems, rather than engaging directly with the system's code. Verification of Object Capability Programs. Drossopoulou and Noble [13, 36] have analysed Miller's Mint and Purse example [30] by expressing it in Joe-E and in Grace [36] , and discussed the six capability policies as proposed in [30] . In [16] , they proposed a complex specification language, and used it to fully specify the six policies from [30] ; uncovering the need for another four policies. More recently, [14] they have shown how different implementations of the underlying Mint and Purse systems coexist with different policies. In contrast, this work formalises the informal ideas from [17] , proposes Focal, which is untyped and modelled on Grace and JavaScript rather than Java; a much simpler specification language Chainmail; the obeys predicate to model trust; MayAccess and MayAffect to model risk; a full specification of the Escrow; and a Hoare logic for reasoning about risk and trust, applied to the Escrow specification.
Conclusions and Further Work
In this paper we addressed the questions of specification of risk, trust, and reasoning about such specifications. To answer these questions, we contributed:
-Hypothetical predicates obeys to model trust, MayAccess and MayAffect to model risk, and their formal semantics. -Open Assertions and Open Policies whose validity must be guaranteed, even when linked with any other code. -Formal models of Focal and Chainmail.
-Hoare four-tuples that make invariants explicit.
-A Hoare logic incorporating code agnostic inference rules.
-Formal reasoning to prove key steps of the Escrow Exchange. In further work we will extend our approach to deal with concurrency, distribution, exceptions, networking, aliasing, and encapsulation. Finally, we hope to develop automated reasoning techniques to make these kinds of specifications practically useful.
